This paper discusses extensions to the functional language Erlang which provide a secure execution environment for remotely sourced code. This is in contrast to much e x i s t i n g w ork which has focused on securing procedural languages. Using a language such as Erlang provides a high degree of inherent run-time safety, which means e ort can be focused on providing a suitable degree of system safety. We found that the main changes needed were the use of unforgeable capability references with access rights to control the use of system resources; the provision of a hierarchy of execution nodes to provide custom views of the resources available and to impose utilisation limits; and support for remote module loading. We then discuss prototype implementations of these changes, used to evaluate their utility and impact on visibility for the users of the language, and mention work in progress using this foundation to specify safety policies by ltering messages to server processes.
Introduction
We p r e s e n t some extensions to the functional language Erlang 4 w h i c h p r o vide a secure execution environment for mobile code. Supporting safe mobile code is an area of considerable recent research, particular with the increasing use of Java and similar languages see surveys such a s 1 4 1 . However much o f t h e w ork has focused upon securing traditional procedural languages or their derivatives. This paper considers the changes needed to secure a production use functional language, Erlang. We believe that using a functional language can provide signi cant bene ts in productivity and maintenance of large applications, and that it would be bene cial to provide these bene ts for applications requiring the use of remotely sourced code. Further, we believe that functional languages have a very high degree of intrinsic run-time safety, which means the changes required to provide a safe execution environment a r e m uch smaller than those needed to secure a procedural language. This paper will discuss the results of our initial prototypes of a safer Erlang, used to investigate these assertions.
We will use the term mobile code to refer to any code sourced remotely from the system it is executed upon. Because the code is sourced remotely, i t is assumed to have a l o wer level of trust than locally sourced code, and hence needs to be executed within some form of constrained or sandbox environment t o protect the local system from accidental or deliberate inappropriate behaviour. A key assumption is that the local system is trusted, and provides adequate access control mechanisms. We also assume that appropriate protection of internode communications, using either encryption techniques eg IPSEC, SSL or physical isolation, is provided.
In his taxonomy of issues related to distributed hypermedia applications, Connolly 11 in particular distinguishes between Run-time Safety | which i s concerned with whether the runtime system will guarantee that the program will behave according to its source code or abort; and System Safety | w h i c h i s concerned with whether it is possible to control access to resources by a piece of executing code. A similar emphasis on constraining resource access or certifying code is identi ed by Hashii et al. 14 , Rubin and Geer 24 , or Adl-Tabatabai et al. 1 amongst others.
Traditionally the necessary protection and access control mechanisms needed for system safety h a ve been supplied using heavyweight processes with hardware assisted memory management. These have a long and successful history as a proven means of providing safety in traditional computing environments. However, we believe that in applications with rapid context changes, such a s w ould be found when loading and running code from a wide range of sources of varying trust levels, such m e c hanisms impose too great an overhead. Further they also tend to restrict the portability of the code sourced. Here we a r e i n terested in the use of lightweight protection mechanisms, which t ypically rely on the use of language features and an abstract machine to provide the necessary safe execution environments for portable code. This has been the approach of most recent into safe mobile code, and may b e regarded as a combination of the Sandbox and Proof-Carrying code approaches identi ed by Rubin and Geer 24 .
The traditional focus for safe mobile code execution has been on securing procedural languages and their run-time environment. The best known example is the development o f J a va 6 from the production C++ language. Other examples include: SafeTCL 23 , Omniware 19, 1 , and Telescript 28 s e e o verviews by Brown 8 , Thorn 29 . With these languages, much e ort has to be expended to provide a suitable degree of run-time safety in order that the system safety can then be provided. In part this has been due to the ease with which types can be forged, allowing unconstrained access to the system. A n umberof attacks on these systems have exploited failures in run-time safety cf Dean et al. 13 , McGraw and Felten 20 , Oaks 22 , or Yellin 31 .
We a r e i n terested in providing safe mobile code support in a functional language. This is motivated by evidence which suggests that the use of a functional language can lead to signi cant bene ts in the development of large applications, by p r o viding a better conceptual match to the problem speci cation. This has been argues conceptually by Hughes 15 for example. Further, signi cant bene ts have been recently reported with large telecommunications applications written in Erlang, see Armstrong 3 . In addition, we believe a dynamically typed, functional language can provide a very high degree of intrinsic run-time safety, since changing the type interpretation should be impossible except perhaps via explicit system calls. This is noted by Connolly 12 , who observes that languages like Objective CAML and Scheme48 provide a high degree of run-time safety, though they need further work to provide an appropriate level of system safety. This should greatly reduce the work required to support safe mobile code execution with such languages. We do need to assume that the basic run-time system correctly enforces type accesses, though the language semantics make c hecking and verifying this considerably easier.
The work on Objective CAML 18 is perhaps closest in some respects to the Safe Erlang system we discuss. However whilst Objective CAML has the necessary features for run-time safety, its system safety relies on the use of signed modules created by trusted compilation sites. Our approach h o wever, provides appropriate system safety b y constraining the execution environment i n to nodes and controlling resource access, so that untrusted imported code is unable to access resources beyond those permitted by t h e p o l i c y i m p o s e d u p o n t h e n o d e within which it executes.
Erlang
For the work discussed in this paper, the authors, initially independently, decided to concentrate on the language Erlang 4, 3, 5 , 2 5 , 3 0 . Erlang is a dynamically typed, single assignment language which uses pattern matching for variable binding and function selection, which has inherent support for lightweight concurrent and distributed processes, and has error detection and recovery mechanisms. It was developed at the Ericsson Computer Science Laboratory to satisfy a requirement for a language suitable for building large soft real-time control systems, particularly telecommunications systems. The Erlang system has now been released as an open source product 26 , and is freely available for download. Most of the Erlang system is written in Erlang including compilers, debuggers, standard libraries, with just the core run-time system and a numberoflow-level system calls known as BIFs for BuiltIn Functions written in C. Distributed use is almost transparent, with processes being spawned on other nodes, instead of locally. An Erlang node is one instance of the run-time environment, often implemented as a single process with many threads on Unix systems.
Erlang is currently being used in the development o f a n umb e r o f v ery large telecommunications applications, and this usage is increasing 3 . In future it is anticipated that applications development will be increasingly outsourced, but that they will be executed on critical systems. Also that there will be a need to support applications which use mobile agents, which can roam over a number of systems. Both of these require the use of mobile code with the provision of an appropriate level of system safety. The extensions we h a ve proposed would, we believe, provide this.
Current Limitations of Erlang
Using Erlang as the core language for a safe execution environment provides a number of advantages. For instance, pure functional language use, where functions manipulate dynamically typed data, and return a value, is intrinsically safe apart from problems of excessive utilisation of cpu, memory etc. It is only when these functions are permitted to have side-e ects that they may threaten system safety. Side e ects are possible in Erlang when a function: accesses other processes by sending and receiving messages or signals, viewing process information, or changing its ags.
accesses external resources outside the Erlang system les, network, hardware devices etc, using the open port BIF.
accesses permanent data in databases managed by the database BIFs.
Thus, a safer Erlang requires controls on when such side-e ects are permitted.
In Erlang, a process is a key concept. Most realistic applications involve t h e use of many processes. A process is referred to by its process identi er pid, which can be used on any node in a distributed Erlang system. Given a pid, other processes can send messages to it, send signals to it including killing it, or examine its process dictionary, amongst other operations. Erlang regards external resources devices, les, other executing programs, network connections etc also as processes albeit with certain restrictions, in much the same way that Unix regards devices as a special sort of le. These processes are called ports and are referred to by their port number, which is used like a pid to access and manipulate the resource.
Consider the following code excerpt from an account management server, which when started, registers itself under the name bank, and then awaits transactions to update the account balance:
-modulebankserver. In standard Erlang a pid or port identi er used to access processes or external resources is both forgeable and too powerful. Apart from legitimately obtaining a pid by being its creator eg Bank pid = spawnBankNode,bankserver,account, 1000 in the example above which creates a new process and returns its pid, receiving it in a message receive Bank pid -ok end,, or looking it up via a registered name Bank pid = whereisbank; it is also possible to obtain a list of all valid pids on the system AllPids = processes, or to simply construct any arbitrary pid from a list of integers FakePid = list to pid 0,23,0 . These latter features are included to support debugging and other services, but open a signi cant safety hole. Further, once a valid pid has been obtained, it may be used not only to send messages to the referenced process FakePid!fself,Ref,-1000g, but to send it signals, including killing it exitFakePid,kill, or inspect its process dictionary process infoFakePid. There is no mechanism in the current speci cation of the Erlang language, to limit the usage of a pid to just sending messages, for example.
Another limitation of the current Erlang system from a safety perspective is the fact that a given Erlang system that is, one instance of the run-time environment forms a single node. All its processes have the same privileges and the same access to all resources le system, modules, window manager, devices managed by the system. There is no mechanism to partition access within a system, so that it may be mediated via a trusted server process. The only current method for providing this is to run a separate system in a separate heavyweight process, at a considerable cost in system cpu, memory etc resources. There is also no means to limit the resources utilised by processes, apart from imposing restrictions on the entire system.
Lastly, there is a need to provide a remote module loading mechanism in order to properly support mobile agents. Whilst Erlang currently supports distributed execution and remote spawning of processes, the module containing the code to be executed must exist on the remote system in its default search path. Further, any modules referenced in the loaded module will also be resolved on the remote system. The code loading must, however, be implemented in such a w ay that the remote code server cannot be tricked into sending code that is secret. Note that pid and port identi ers are globally unique, so they may b e passed in messages between nodes whilst maintaining their correct referent.
Extensions for a Safer Erlang
In order to address the de ciencies identi ed above, we believe that extensions are required in the following areas:
capabilities may be used to impose a ner granularity o f c o n trol on the use of process and other resource identi ers, making these unforgeable with a speci ed set of rights on the use of any speci c instance.
nodes that form a hierarchy within an Erlang system one instance of the runtime environment, to provide a custom context of services available, to restrict the use of code with access to external resources, and to impose utilisation limits on cpu, memory etc.
remote module loading may be used to allow execution of code modules sourced on another system, retaining knowledge of the source system so that subsequent module references can also be sourced from that system, rather than the local module library.
Capabilities
We de ne a capability as a globally unique in time and space, unforgeable name for a speci c instance of some resource, and a list of rights for operations permitted on the resource by holders of the capability. We use such capabilities to replace the existing forgeable, unconstrained identi ers for nodes, ports, processes etc.
The same resource may be referred to from di erent capabilities giving the owners of those capabilities di erent r i g h ts. We are using capabilities to ensure that these identi ers cannot be forged, and to limit their usage to the operations desired. A capability i s a l w ays created and veri ed upon use on the node which manages the resource which it references, and these resources never migrate. This node thus speci es the domain for the capability, and is able to select the most appropriate mechanism to provide the desired level of security. Further, the resources referenced are never reused a new process, even with the same arguments, is still a new instance, for example, so revocation is not the major issue it traditionally is in capability systems. In our usage capabilities are invalidated when their associated resource is destroyed eg. the process dies. Other processes may possess invalid capabilities, but any attempt to use them will raise an invalid capability exception.
The use of capabilities to control resource access echoes it use to provide safe resource use in systems such as Amoeba 27 . However Amoeba was a general operating system, which had to use heavyweight protection mechanisms to isolate processes running arbitrary machine code from each other, and to provide custom contexts. Here we rely on the language features and an abstract machine to provide lightweight protection mechanisms at much lower cost in system resource use.
Capabilities may be implemented in several ways, including:
Encrypted hash Capabilities use a cryptographic hash function cf 17 to create a encrypted check v alue for the capability information, which i s then kept in the clear. Only the node of creation for the capability can create and check this hash value. The overhead of validating the check v alue can be minimised if any local encrypted capabilities are checked once on creation or import and then simply agged as such say by amending the hidden data type tag to indicate that it has been veri ed. Subsequent use of the capability then incurs no overhead. Further, for remote capabilities, any delays due to cryptographic overheads are likely to be swamped by network latencies. Each node would keep the key used to create and validate its capabilities secret, and this key could be randomly selected when the node is initialised. Any previously created capabilities must refer to no longer extent instances of resources from a previous incarnation of the node, so there is no requirement t o c o n tinue to be able to validate them. This approach could be attacked by attempts to guess the key used, and verifying the guess against intercepted capability data. The likelihood of success will depend on the type of hash function used, so some care is needed in its selection to avoid known aws in some obvious modes of use 7 .
Password sparse Capabilities 2 , 27 use a large random value selected sparsely from a large address space to protect the capability, with the node of creation maintaining a table of all its valid capabilities. This table is checked whenever it is presented with a capability, and capabilities may be revoked by removal from this table. One disadvantage of this approach is the size this table may g r o w to, particularly for long running server processes, or when user de ned capabilities are used, where it is impossible to know when they have n o further use. Another is that large tables may t a k e some time to search, though careful selection of the table mechanism can reduce this to a minimum. It is possible to try and forge such a capability, but success is statistically highly improbable, and attempts should be detectable by abnormally high numbers of requests presenting invalid capabilities.
There is thus a tradeo between these alternatives | trading some level of security with encrypted capabilities for space with password capabilities. The best alternative is likely to depend on the target environment.
Experience with the prototypes has shown that it is important for e cient execution that all information needed to evaluate guard tests or pattern matches bepresent locally in the capability. This information must include the type eg node, port, process and the value to test if two capabilities refer to the same object. Because di erent applications may w i s h t o c hoose between the security tradeo s, we decided to support both hash and password capabilities, chosen o n a n o d e b y n o d e b a s i s , i n a n i n teroperable mechanism, where only the node of creation need know the actual implementation. Thus, we h a ve c hosen to use capabilities with the following components:
Type,NodeId,Value,Rights,Private , where:
Type the type of resource referenced, eg. module, node, pid, port, or user.
NodeId the node of creation, which c a n v erify the validity o f t h e capability or perform operations on the speci ed resource.
Value the resource instance referenced by the capability module, node, process identi er, port identi er, or any Erlang term, respectively
Rights a list of operations permitted on the resource.
The actual rights depend on the type of the capability. For a process capability these could include: exit,link,register,restrict,send .
Private an opaque term used by the node of creation to verify the validity of the capability. It could either be a cryptographic check v alue, or a random password value: only the originating node need know. A capability m a y be restricted assuming it permits it. This results in the creation of a new capability, referencing the same resource, but with a more restricted set of rights. Using this, a server process can, for example, register its name against a restricted capability for itself, permitting other processes to only send to it. eg. registerbank, restrictself, send,register Capabilities would be returned by or used instead of the existing node names, pids, or ports, by BIFs which create or use these resources.
Nodes
We h a ve p r o vided support for a hierarchy o f nodes within an Erlang run-time system an existing Erlang node. These provide a custom context of services available, restrict the use of code with side-e ects, and impose utilisation limits eg on cpu, memory etc. Functionally, these would be similar to existing Erlang nodes with some additional features.
A custom context for processes is provided by h a ving distinct: registered names table of local names and associated capability i d e n ti ers, used to advertise services. These names are not visible on other nodes. module alias table which maps the name used in the executing code to the name used locally for the loaded module. This module name aliasing mechanism is used to support both redirection of names to safer variants of modules, as well as to provide unique names for modules loaded from remote systems for agents or applets. This table is consulted to map the module name on all external function calls, applys, and spawns.
capability data which is all the information eg. keys or table necessary to create and validate unforgeable capabilities for the node.
Restrictions on side-e ects are enforced by specifying whether or not each of the following are permissible for all processes which execute on the node: open port for direct access to external resources managed by t h e local system. external process access for access to processes running on other Erlang systems, which could provide unmediated access to other resources, or reveal information about the local system to other nodes.
database BIFs usage for access to permanent data controlled by the local database manager.
When disabled, access to such resources would have to be mediated by server processes running on the local system, but in a more privileged node, trusted to enforce an appropriate access policy for safety. Typically these servers are advertised in the registered names table of the restricted node.
Utilisation limits can be imposed by a node for all processes executing within the node, or any descendent c hild nodes of it. Limits could be imposed on some of cpu usage, memory usage, max no reductions; or perhaps on combinations of these.
The general approach to creating a controlled execution environment is as follows. First, a number of servers are started in a node with suitable privileges to provide controlled access to resources. Then a node would be created with side-e ects disabled. Its registered names table would be preloaded to reference these servers, its loaded modules table pre-loaded with appropriate local library and safe alias names; and appropriate utilisation limits set. Processes would then be spawned in this node to execute the desired mobile code modules, in a now appropriately constrained environment. eg.
BankNode=newnodenode,ourbank, fproc rights, g
Remote Module Loading
Our prototypes do not directly support mobile processes as once started, a process may not migrate. However, a new process may be spawned o at a remote node. We h a ve included extensions which ensure that subsequent module references from within a remotely loaded module are also sourced from the originating node, rather than being resolved from the local module library. This is to ensure that a package of multiple modules will execute correctly, remotely, and not be confused with local modules that may h a ve the same name.
Supporting this required an extension of the apply BIF handler so that it checks whether the originating module is local or remote, and proceeds accordingly to interpret the module requested in context, querying the code server on the remote node for the module, if necessary. Some care is needed in managing the acquisition of an appropriate capability for requested module. This is issued by the remote code server upon receipt of a request which includes a valid capability for the parent module, and is then used to request the loading of the requested module.
Prototypes
A n umber of prototypes of a safer Erlang environment, with di ering goals and features supported, have been trialed.
SafeErlang was developed by Gustaf Naeser and Dan Sahlin in during 1996 21 . The system supports a hierarchy of subnodes to control resource usage and to support remotely loaded modules; encrypted capabilities for pids and nodes to control their usage; and remote module loading. Whilst this prototype was successfully used to trial a mobile agent application, limitations were found with the complexity of its implementation, the incomplete usage of capabilities for all resource items in particular for ports, and the use of fully encrypted capabilities and the consequent need to decrypt them before any information could be used.
In Uppsala, as a students project, a design for safe mobile agents, was implement e d i n 1 9 9 6 1 6 . Distributed Erlang was not used in that system, which instead was based on KQML communication. Safety was supported by protected secure domains spanning a number of nodes, where it was assumed that all nodes within a single domain were friendly.
More recently the SSErl prototype was developed by Brown 10 to address the perceived de ciencies of the previous prototypes. It supports a hierarchy of nodes on each Erlang system which provide a custom context for processes in them, the use of both hash and password capabilities for pids, ports, and nodes to constrain the use of these values; and remote module loading. This prototype has evolved through a number of versions in the process of re ning and clarifying the proposed changes.
Both of the latter prototypes implement the language extensions using glue functions for a number of critical BIFs. These are substituted by a modi ed Erlang compiler which itself is written in Erlang. The glue routines interact with node server processes, one for each distinct node on the Erlang system. Most of the SSErl glue functions have the form:
possibly resolve a registered name to capability check with the node manager to see if the operation is permitted by t h e capabilities rights, and if not, to throw an exception otherwise some key information is returned eg a real pid or capability perform the desired operation in the user4s process Both support a hierarchy o f nodes within an Erlang run-time system an existing Erlang node. Each node is represented by a node manager process, which manages the state for that node, and interacts with the glue routines to manage resource access.
SSErl capabilities are a tuple with the components identi ed previously: fType,NodeId,Value,Rights,Privateg which specify the type of resource the capability references, the node managing that resource, the resource instance, the list of access rights permitted on the resource, and the opaque validation value crypto hash or password for the capability.
To restrictCapa,Rights creates a new version of the supplied capability, referring to the same resource, but with a more restricted set of rights.
sameCapa1,Capa2 guard testing whether the supplied capabilities refer to the same resource, without verifying the check value for e ciency reasons.
Except when explicitly con guring the execution environment, the new features are mostly invisible to existing user programs. The SSErl prototype successfully compiles many of the standard library modules only those interacting with ports require some minor, systematic, changes necessitated by the protocol currently used. It is now being used to trial some demonstration applications.
These prototypes have demonstrated that the Erlang language can be successfully extended to support safe execution environments with minimal visible impact on most code. In the future we a n ticipate that these extensions will be incorporated into the Erlang run-time environment. This should remove some unavoidable incompatibilities such a s w i t h ports found in the prototypes, as well as ensuring that these safety extensions cannot be bypassed.
Safe Erlang Applications
Our work has mainly concentrated on design and implementation issues. However, a couple of simple applications have been successfully implemented within the prototypes, validating the basic approach w e h a ve proposed.
In 1998, Otto Bj orkstr o, implemented a distrubuted game where a number of players share a common board, each taking their turn in order.
The board itself is implemented with a server, and to enter the game a player only needs to send a message to the server containing a reference to a local protected node where the server will spawn o a process representing the player. Code loading is thus made transparent. The local process is quite restricted, but may draw a n y graphics within a certain window on the player's screen.
Being able to draw a n y graphics on a screen makes the user vulnerable to a "Trojan Horse" attack as the process might draw new windows asking for sensitive information such a passwords. We h a ve been contemplating drawing a distinctive border around windows controlled by remote code to warn the user about this potential hazard.
The second application implemented concerned the remote control of a telephone exchange. Here no code was spawned, and the essential functionality w as to prevent anybody else from taking over control of the exchange. In fact, a system without encryption, just having an authentication mechanism would be su cient for this application. In countries where use encryption is restricted, this might b e a n i n teresting mode of operation.
5 Further Work -Custom Safety Policies
The extensions described above provide mechanisms necessary to impose an appropriate safety policy, without enforcing any speci c policy. Work is now continuing on providing an appropriate level of system safety by executing the mobile code in a constrained environment created using these extensions, trusted to prevent direct access to any external resources by the executing mobile code, and then applying lters to messages between the mobile code and server processes which mediate the access to resources. This allows the use of standard servers, but with distinct policies being imposed for each instance. By restricting the security problem domain to just verifying that the messages conform to the desired policy, the problem should be considerably more tractable than approaches based on proo ng the imported code directly, for example. It is also much more e cient than approaches which attempt to validate all function calls. The use of such a safety check function on client-server messages was sketched in Brown 9 . 6 Conclusions This paper describes proposed extensions to Erlang to enhance its ability t o s u pport safe execution of remotely sourced code. The changes include the provision of a hierarchy of nodes to provide a custom context, restrictions on side-e ects, and resource limits; and the use of unforgeable references capabilities with associated rights of use for modules, nodes, processes, ports, and user de ned references. Also, extensions are needed to support remote code loading in context. Two experimental prototypes, used to evaluate the utility of these extensions, are then described. Finally, mention is made of ongoing work using this safe execution environment as a foundation for imposing custom safety policies by ltering messages to server processes.
